University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2007

Bluetooth-base Worm Modeling And Simulation
Haiou Xiang
University of Central Florida

Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Engineering Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Xiang, Haiou, "Bluetooth-base Worm Modeling And Simulation" (2007). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations, 2004-2019. 3418.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/3418

BLUETOOTH-BASE WORM MODELING AND SIMULATION

by

HAIOU XIANG
B.A. Chongqing University, 1998

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science
in School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in College of Engineering and Computer Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2007

ABSTRACT

Bluetooth is one of the most popular technologies in the world in the new century.
Meanwhile it attracts attackers to develop new worm and malicious code attacking
Bluetooth wireless network. So far the growth of mobile malicious code is very fast and
they have become a great potential threat to our society. In this thesis, we study
Bluetooth worm in Mobile Wireless Network. Firstly we investigate the Bluetooth
technology and several previously appeared Bluetooth worms, e.g. “Caribe”,”Comwar”,
and we find the infection cycle of a Bluetooth worm. Next, we develop a new simulator,
Bluetooth Worm simulator (BTWS), which simulates Bluetooth worm’ behaviors in
Mobile wireless networks. Through analyzing the result, we find i) In ideal environment
the mobility of Bluetooth device can improve the worm’s propagation speed, but
combining mobility and inquiry time issue would cause a Bluetooth worm to slow down
its propagation under certain situation. ii) The number of initially infected Bluetooth
devices mostly affects the beginning propagation speed of a worm, and energy issue
can be ignored because the new technology can let Bluetooth device keeping work for a
long time. iii) Co-channel interference and setting up monitoring system in public place
can improve the security of Bluetooth wireless network.
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CHAPTER 1:
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background of Network Worm

A computer worm is a self-replicating computer program. It uses a network to
sent copies of itself to other nodes (computer terminals on the network) and it may do
so without any user intervention [5]. Unlike a virus, it does not need to attach itself to an
existing program. The first worm, the Christmas Tree EXEC, appeared on a worldwide
network in 1987, which spread across both IBM’s own international network and
BITNET [6]. Actually, Christmas Tree EXEC was technically a Trojan horse (a program
that installs malicious software while under the guise of doing something else). The first
worm that caused massive disruption of the internet was the Morris worm, written by a
computer science graduate student at Cornell University in 1988 [7].
When human enters the 21st century, the worm stars its engine and brings
disaster to the internet. On July 13, 2001, the most famous Internet worm, Code Red [9],
was noticed because of its unbelievable spreading speed. On July 18 Security company
eEye Digital Security discovered the flaw in IIS that Code Red exploits. Code Red worm
exploited a vulnerability in the indexing software distributed with IIS [11, 12], spreading
itself using a common type of vulnerability known as a buffer overflow. It does this by
using a long string of a repeated character ‘N’ to overflow a buffer, allowing the worm to
execute an arbitrary code and infect the machine. Then the infected host attempts to
connect to TCP port 80 of randomly generated IP addresses in order to propagate the
worm. At the same time, the worm starts 100 worm threads in memory. When the date
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is between the 20th and 27th of a month, the worm starts a denial-of-service attack on
www.whitehouse.gov. On July 19, it infected 359,000 [8, 10] hosts in internet. The worse
situation is that more than 2,000 new hosts were infected each minute. 43% of all
infected hosts were in the United State, and 19% of all compromised machines were the
.NET Top Level Domain, followed by .COM with 14% [9].
With the development of computer technology, the Internet worms have
developed into different types as well. An email worm [13] spreads via email messages.
Typically, the worm code contains in email attachment or the email may contain a link to
an infected website. Once a user activates the worm, it can use “social engineering”,
such as user’s contact address book, to propagate itself. In modern society, a lot of
younger like to chat in internet, so an IRC worm [14] uses the chat channels to spread
infected files. Another popular internet application is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) application. A
file-sharing networks worm places itself in a shared folder and spreads via the P2P
network [15]. Internet worms not only disrupt the network traffic, but also have payload
to implement many kinds of attacks, such as installing backdoor, deleting system files,
or encrypting files.
Internet worms have already become a major threat in the internet due to their
faster spreading and its serious devastating. According to the report of London-based
market intelligence firm Mi2g in 2003 ‘Code Red’ worm brought almost $2.6 billion in
productivity cost, and SQL ‘Slammer’ worm caused between $950 million and $1.2
billion in lost productivity in its first five days worldwide. These costs do not include
labors costs and cleanup costs. In 2006, from the FBI’s survey [16] from 2,066
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organizations, “This would be 2.8 million U.S. organizations experiencing at least one
computer security incident. With each of these 2.8 million organizations incurring a
$24,000 average loss, this would total $67.2 billion per year.” In this survey, worms,
viruses and Trojan horses were most costly computer crime.
1.2

Background of Bluetooth Network Worm

Wireless has already been one of the most important technologies in 21 Century.
Mobile phone is not just a telephone and becomes an intelligent device with multifunction. Smart devices, such as PDAs, smart phones, on-board car computers, and
even new generation appliances are now equipped with communications functions.
Nowadays, human live in a huge Wireless network and are entering a wireless era. In
the meantime, wireless technology open a new window to attacker, and parts of
attacking techniques had been immigrated to wireless network.
IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and Bluetooth are the primary wireless technology in internet.
Although both of technologies were implemented in 1990’s, the first mobile virus
appeared in June 2004, and it was called ‘Caribe’ [17]. Caribe was written for the
Symbian OS and spread via Bluetooth [38]. In July 2004, antivirus company discovered
another mobile virus, ‘Duts’ [18], which is the first mobile virus to infect the Windows CE
OS. One more month later, the first backdoor virus for mobile platforms appeared,
called ‘Brador’. Then several Trojan viruses were developed for Symbian platform, such
as ‘Mosquit’, ‘Locknut’, ‘Dampig’ [39, 40, 41], and so on. Until January 2005, a new
mobile virus, ‘Comwar’ [19], brought new functionality – the first malicious program with
the ability to propagate via MMS. From above introduction, we notice the speed of
3

increasing number of mobile virus grows significantly. Figure 1 shows mobile virus, 15
mobile virus and 27 variants were discovered during one year.

Figure 1 Increase in The Number of Known Mobile Virus Families
(Source: Viruslist.com - An overview of mobile device security)
In section 1, we know the internet worm is popular in wired networks, but in
mobile networks, there are only two popular worms, ‘Caribe’ and ‘Comwar’. The Cabir
worm is the first Bluetooth worm that runs in Symbian mobile phones that support
Series 60 platform. The Cabir worm replicates over Bluetooth connections and arrives to
phone messaging inbox as caribe.sis file what contains the worm. When user clicks the
caribe.sis and chooses to install the file the worm activates and starts looking for new
devices to infect over Bluetooth. When the Cabir worm finds another Bluetooth device, it
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will send infected SIS files to its neighbor, and lock to that phone so that it won’t look
other phones even when the target moves out of range. The Comwar worm uses MMS
or Bluetooth technologies to propagate that operates on Symbian Series 60 devices,
either. ComWar not only spread over Bluetooth but also MMS. If it is the first hour of the
14th of any month, the threat resets the device.
In 2006, over 600 million Bluetooth-enabled devices were shipped [32], and there
are more than a billion Bluetooth units to be installed. People use Bluetooth at home for
internet or intranet, use Bluetooth headset for cell phone, number of Bluetooth hot-spots
also are set up in Coffee, restaurant and cinema. Bluetooth Indeed give people
convenience, but it also provides a chance for attacker to spread worm in wider range.
1.3

Properties and Characteristics of Bluetooth
1.3.1 History of Bluetooth Technology

Bluetooth wireless technology is a short-range communications technology
intended to replace the cables connecting portable and/or fixed devices while
maintaining high levels of security. In 1994, the Swedish company Ericsson initiated the
Bluetooth Technology movement [20]. "The original intention was to make a wireless
connection between something like an earphone and a cordless headset and the mobile
phone," Haartsen said who is Bluetooth co-inventor. In 1998 the Bluetooth Special
Interest Group (SIG) is formed and officially adopts the project name “Bluetooth” as the
name of the technology. From 1999 to 2004, Bluetooth SIG adopts three Bluetooth Core
Specification Versions, now it is Version 2.0 + Enhanced Data Rate [21].
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1.3.2 Features of Bluetooth Technology
1.3.2.1 Unlicensed Spectrum
Bluetooth Technology operates in the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical
(ISM) band at 2.4 to 2.485 GHz, using a spread spectrum, frequency hopping, fullduplex signal at a nominal rate of 1600 hops/sec.
1.3.2.2 Efficient Interference
Adaptive frequency hopping (AFH) capability in Bluetooth Technology reduces
the interference between wireless technologies sharing the 2.4GHz spectrum. This
adaptive hopping allows for more efficient transmission with the spectrum, providing
users with greater performance. The signal hops among 79 frequencies at 1 MHz
intervals to give a high degree of interference immunity.
1.3.2.3 Three Operating Range
Class 3 radios: up to 1 meter
Class 2 radios: 10 meters (most using in mobile devices)
Class 1 radios: 100 meters (industrial use cases)
1.3.2.4 Low Power Consumption
Most users used Class 2 radios, so its power is 2.5mW. In addition, the Bluetooth
device is allowed radios to be power down when inactive.
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1.3.2.5 Data Rate
In Bluetooth Core Specification Version 1.2, Data Rate is set to 1 Mbps; however,
in Version 2.0 + EDR, it increases to 3 Mbps.
1.3.3 Operation of Bluetooth Technology
Bluetooth core system consists of an RF transceiver, baseband, and protocol
stack. The system offers services that enable the connection of devices and the
exchange of a variety of data classes between these devices. Figure 2 shows the
Core_System_Architecture.

Figure 2 Core System Architecture of Bluetooth
(Source: Bluetooth Specification 2.0)
In physical layer (Radio layer), the Bluetooth RF operates in unlicensed ISM
band at 2.4GHz. The system employs a frequency hop transceiver to combat
interference and fading, and provides many FHSS carriers. When Bluetooth devices
operate in Radio layer, they shape to a group in which each device is synchronized to a
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common clock and frequency hopping pattern. One device is called the master that
provides the synchronization reference. All others are called slaves. The master and the
slaves form a piconet. Devices in a piconet use a specific frequency hopping pattern
that is a pesudo-random ordering of the 79 frequencies in the ISM band. The data is
stored in package and is transmitted by a number of consecutive time slots. In addition,
the physical link is formed between any two devices that transmit packets in either
direction.
Above physical layer there is Logical layer (Baseband layer) and L2CAP layer. In
the Logical layer, logical link can control flow, acknowledgement/repeat mechanisms,
sequence numbering and scheduling behavior, and logical transports carry different
types of logical links.
The highest layer is L2CAP layer that provides a channel-based abstraction to
applications and services. It carries out segmentation and reassembly of application
data and multiplexing and de-multiple channels over a shared logical link. L2CAP has a
protocol control channel that is carried over the default ACL logical transport.
1.4

Bluetooth Worm Infection

Before Bluetooth worm propagate in wireless network, the attacker need discover
vulnerable node. In Bluetooth operations, a Bluetooth-enabled device uses the inquiry
procedure to discover nearby devices, or to be discovered by devices in their locality.
When a Bluetooth-enabled device tries to find new devices, it enters inquiry sub-state.
In this sub-state, it shall repeatedly transmit the inquiry message at different hop
frequencies. If a Bluetooth-enabled device allows itself to be discovered, it shall
8

regularly enter the inquiry scan sub-state to respond to inquiry messages. When the
inquiry message is received in the inquiry scan sub-state, the recipient shall return an
inquiry response (FHS) packet containing the recipient’s device address and other
parameters. The entire inquiry procedure is asymmetrical, and does not use any of the
architectural layers above the physical layer.
After neighbors discovering, two Bluetooth-enabled devices enter paging
(connecting) procedure. In order to set up a connection between two devices, only the
Bluetooth device address is required. In the page scan sub-state, the device shall select
the scan frequency according to the page hopping sequence determined by the device’s
address. Because there are master and slave in a piconet, the master enters page substate in page scan sub-state. The master tries to coincide with the slave’s scan activity
by repeatedly transmitting the paging message consisting of the slave’s device access
code (DAC) in different hop channels. On receiving the page message, the slave enters
the slave response sub-state that the salve device transmits a slave page response
message. Then the master receives a slave page response message, it enters the
master response sub-state. The master shall transmit an FHS packet to slave device. If
the slave’s response is received by the master, the master enters the connection state
and starts to transmit data.
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Figure 3 Messaging at Initial Connection
(Source: Bluetooth Specification 2.0)
For a regular Bluetooth device, they are usually in Idle (sleep state). In this paper,
however, attacker always is in inquiry state. Firstly it broadcasts the inquiry message.
When Bluetooth enabled devices response the inquiry request, attacker generates a
neighbor list table. It extracts one of neighbor to set up the connection as slave device.
If successful connection, infected file will be sent to vulnerable device. Then attacker
disconnect with infected device. During the process of replicating infected file and
disconnecting, there exists a timer, when the timer expired, the attacker device
automatically stop the connection and try to connect other neighbor in table. If the
neighbor list table is empty, attacker will broadcast a new inquiry message. When the
user of vulnerable device runs the infected file, it is infected and starts to broadcast an
inquiry message to find new vulnerable neighbors. Figure 4 describes the entire
procedure of Bluetooth worm infection.
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Replicate worm code
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Figure 4 Bluetooth Worm Infection Life Cycle

1.5

Wireless Network Simulator Introduction

In computer network research, network simulation is a technique where a
program simulates the behavior of a network. There exist several Free/Open Source
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network simulators, such as NS, OMNet++, GloMoSim, Shunra, NetSim, and OPNET.
Most of them include the wireless network simulation.
In addition, IBM developed BlueHoc [22] simulator that is a Bluetooth extension
for NS (ver2.1b6). It implements basic features of Bluetooth baseband, Logical Link
Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) and Link Manager Protocol (LMP), and it adds
eight C++ classes to ns to support device discovery, paging and connection
establishment functions, and it has trace support and graphical interface. After BlueHoc,
MIT developed another Bluetooth simulator, Blueware [23]. It is still an ns extension and
is based on the BlueHoc simulator. Therefore, Blueware uses the most of original code,
but it adds large number of new code. In particular, Blueware provides an easy-toprogram interface to various scatter net formation, link scheduling schemes and their
related algorithm, TSF and LCS. Blueware works with NS (ver 2.1b7a).
Although BlueHoc and Blueware implement most of basic functions of Bluetooth,
they were developed in 2002 and just work at NS’s old version, the newest NS2 [24] is
ver2.31 (released Mar 10, 2007), and also they support Bluetooth specification 1.1, the
newest Bluetooth specification is ver2.0 + Enhanced Data Rate. Because both of above
simulator cannot satisfy the new NS2 and Bluetooth specification, University of
Cincinnati developed a new Bluetooth simulator, UCBT [25], which works at NS-2
(ver2.28 even later version) and partially support Bluetooth specification 2.0. As same
features with BlueHoc and Blueware, UCBT is NS-2 based simulator and supports basic
Bluetooth functions as well. It, however, adds more than 28,000 lines of C++ codes, and
it adapts to the PAN profile with Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol (BNEP) and
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Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) specification, and it takes clock drift into account. UCBT is
the most accurate, complete and up-to-date open-source Bluetooth simulator.
1.6

BTWS (Bluetooth Worm Simulator)

From pervious section, we learn that NS-2 and OPNET are so large and complex,
and they are good at simulating small size of network, but for large scale network they
run slowly and low efficiency. BlueHoc and Blueware are too old to compatible for new
C++ complier. UCBT is a full implementation of the Bluetooth protocol stack, but it is
specially developed for Bluetooth scatter net research and does not support worm
propagation model. In our simulation, we focus on propagation of Bluetooth worm.
Simulator need support worm behaviors. Unfortunately, there is no simulator to provide
worm model.
Therefore, I develop new simulator, BTWS (Bluetooth Worm Simulator). In our
research, we mainly consider how the Bluetooth worm propagates quickly in wireless
network and what parameters infect the spreading speed of the worm. In BTWS, we
don’t concern scatter net and energy issue. BTWS uses some NS-2 codes that are
wireless class, so every Bluetooth device is a node with speed, location and
communication range properties. BTWS has several advantages. It can calculate the
worm propagation quickly. It isn’t a NS-2 extension, so its size is so small and support
both small and large scale wireless network.
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1.7

Contribution of Thesis

In this thesis, we research on worm propagation behaviors in wireless network
and focus on wireless Bluetooth technology. Our primary contributions in this thesis are
below:
• From Bluetooth technology specification, we learn the mechanisms of the
Bluetooth worm propagation.
• Develop a new simulation – BTWS (Bluetooth Worm Simulation), which is
based on part of Bluetooth technology specification 2.0 and uses some of NS-2’s code.
• Simulate two sizes of wireless network, Local scale and Wide scale.
--In local scale simulation, we simulate worm propagation with different
properties, such as density, speed, the number of initially infected nodes, contact
degree and inquiry time. Faster speed helps worm propagation, but longer inquiry time
and co-channel interference reduce the worm propagation.
--In Wide scale simulation, we implement five scenarios to learn that there will
be a positive impact for Bluetooth worm propagation if Bluetooth-enabled devices often
transfer among different groups.
In section 1, this paper introduces the background of computer worm in wired
networks and wireless mobile networks. In section 2, we discuss some related work with
the Bluetooth worm. We simulate the worm behaviors in local scale and wide scale
network environments in section 3. Then, in section 4, we try to find defense method for
Bluetooth worm. Finally, in section 5, we present our conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2:

RELATED WORK

Researcher had already done a lot of work on Internet worm including wire and
wireless network, and most of them focus on analyzing, modeling and simulating. But
for Bluetooth wireless network, there are few papers, especially on worm propagation
behaviors analyzing. Yan et al. [1] propose a baseline worm model to analyze the speed
of Bluetooth worm propagation. Yan also use the radio propagation model to calculate
signal attenuation. Through simulation he analyzes the effects of speed, density and
network size and either did dynamics analysis in different scenarios. He found that
mobility may not be key feature for Bluetooth worm propagation, and link instability
owing could reduce the worm spreading speed, and the inference factor even slow
down the worm propagation in high density network. Except of Bluetooth network, Yan
considers the out-of-band propagation. An intelligent attacker cannot only use Bluetooth
technology, but also he can use GSM/CDMA and GPRS technology to accelerate worm
spreading [27].
Mickens et al. [2] find the standard worm propagation models cannot satisfy with
mobile network, so he introduced new model, called probabilistic queuing. He uses
several examples to demonstrate the failure of the Kephart-White model [30] in mobile
environments, which cannot capture the non-trivial connectivity variances and is
insensitive to node speed in mobile environments. Probabilistic queuing model treats
node mobility as a first-order concern. It provides an accurate threshold condition
related with the virulence of malicious code to the likelihood, and it also provide
accurate estimates of these persistent infection levels.
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Bose et al. [3] notice the growth of the SMS/MMS and Bluetooth technology will
bring the more mobile viruses and worm in mobile environment. They study MMS and
Bluetooth devices vulnerabilities in-depth and developed a fine-grained agent-based
mal-ware modeling (AMM) framework to study the worm propagation. They use the
SMS usage characterization collected call data records and SS7 traces [31] from a
large cellular carrier to simulate the worm spreading. The results show the growth rate
of a mobile virus exploiting SMS messages is small, but the growth rate increases
significantly when these handsets are highly vulnerable to Bluetooth exploits.
Su et al. [4] and other researcher at University of Toronto did a preliminary
investigation of the worm infection in Bluetooth environment. They implement real
experiments, which use PDAs to scan other Bluetooth devices in Mall and subway. The
results of tracing activities show it is very quickly and easy for Bluetooth worm to spread
in a popular place. Moreover, mobility cannot impact the worm exploiting vulnerability
and whatever the direction is. In addition, they use trace-driven simulation to do
experiment in a large scale network [29]. They find Bluetooth worm can infect 10,000
devices in a few days and spreads more rapidly in day than does in night. N srl et al. [37]
creates a BlueBag device to convert attack and scan Bluetooth device. They
demonstrate the existence of a very high risk potential, created by low awareness, everincreasing functionalities and complexity, and by the feasibility of targeted, covert
attacks through Bluetooth-enabled malware.
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Other researchers do not study especially in Bluetooth technology but in other
wireless network. Khayam et al. [33] develop a new model, topologically-aware worm
propagation model for wireless sensor networks. It takes the MAC layer interference into
consideration. In his simulation, he also performs the Box-Muller transformation [34] to
generate Gaussian random variable for simulating the fading affected of neighbor nodes.
Finally, the new model accurately predicts the result of simulation. However this model
just fit in stationary environment. Hoh et al [35] study the worm propagation in ad hoc
with wide-area network. He proposes a new architecture for an intrusion response
system by developing and analyzing location-based quarantine boundary estimation
techniques. The detection probability of this technique is greater than 95% and a falsealarm rate of less than about 35%. Wagner et al. [36] investigates the behavior of the
worm propagation and design worm simulation to predict its spreading potential in order
to defense worm by early detection.
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CHAPTER 3:

SIMULATION

In my experiment, there are two parts: local wireless networks and wide wireless
networks. Bluetooth technology has a limitation that devices with Bluetooth-function just
communicate within an operating range; therefore, the Bluetooth worm can spread
faster in a high-density public place than in a low-density walking road. In the simulation,
most experiments simulate the Bluetooth worm in a local group. However, in the real
world, people often transfers from one place to another place, and cell phone carriers
cover range as large as possible in order to achieve the biggest revenue. So I need to
simulate the Bluetooth worm propagation in a wide environment as well.
In a local wireless network, all nodes (individual Bluetooth device) are arranged
in an area and their movement is limited to that local network, and no node can move
outside, which means a stationary environment. On the other hand, in wide wireless
networks, there exist many groups, and nodes in each group can be exchanged, which
means a mutable environment.
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Table 1 Parameter List
Parameter Name

Unit

Description

Node

Number

Bluetooth-enabled device

Initially infected

Number

The number of worm source

m2

Simulation Environment Area

node
Square Area
Density

Node / Square Area

Speed

meter / second

Operating range

meter

Contact degree

Number of slave per master

Propagation Time

second

Healthy rate

%

Inquiry time

second

Infected rate

%

The number of nodes in Simulation
Environment Area
The speed of Bluetooth-enabled device
Communicating range between two
Bluetooth-enabled devices
The number of slave nodes per master
node
Bluetooth worm spreading time
The immunizing Bluetooth devices /
Total Bluetooth devices
Time of scanning neighbor + setting up
connection + Time of transferring
Infected file
Simulation stop when infected nodes
reach infected rate X Total nodes

Table 2 Default Parameters Assumption
Square Area
Nodes
Initially infected Node
Speed

1000 X 1000

Simulation Num

50

200

Operating Range

10 m

Infected rate in simulation

95%

3
2 m/s

Parameters Table lists the most of parameters used in our simulation, and default
parameters table presents the default assumption. There is small difference settings
between every simulation and it will be described in each part.
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3.1

Simulation in Local Wireless Network

I assume the local network is in 1000 X 1000 square areas. Each node
(Individual Bluetooth-enabled device) has several properties, such as position,
destination position, and speed and infection status. All nodes in this area are mobile,
and they move from one position to a random destination position, and when nodes
arrive to the destination, they will randomly move to another position and continue this
process. During the simulation, each node calculates the distance between itself and
other nodes, if it finds one node is within operating range, it adds the neighbor into its
neighbor list table. Next, it checks the neighbor’s infection status. If the neighbor node is
not infected, it will establish connection and transfer the infected file, otherwise, it
iterates other neighbors in the table. In the experiment, we simulate the Bluetooth
worm’s behavior with different parameters, such as speed and operating range. In
Bluetooth specification, inquiring and paging sessions find neighbors and then set up
connection with them. This procedure is a dominate part in Bluetooth communication.
Therefore, we consider two cases, ideal case (discovering neighbors + set up
connection time + transfer file time ≈ zero) and real case (discovering neighbors + set
up connection time + transfer file time > zero). In addition, contact degree is one factor
to be simulated, and there are still two cases, one of which is that contact degree is one
and in the other contact degree is up to seven. Except for node’s properties, we also
simulate different scenarios including different density of the network, different numbers
of initially infected nodes.
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As we know, one of the important factors of Bluetooth technology is energy, but in
our experiment we do not consider the energy model. All of simulations are under the
ideal energy model that every node is alive during the simulation. We will discuss the
reasons later.
3.1.1 Propagation Speed
The Bluetooth worm has similar properties with other computer worms, which
self-replicate as fast as possible. The first experiment simulates propagation speed so
that we can study the behavior of the worm spreading process. I use the default
assumption to do this experiment and calculate the number of infected nodes per 100 s.
In Figure 5, the two sides, the beginning and the end of worm propagation, the
spreading speed is low because there are few infected node at the start time and at the
end it is difficult to find un-infected neighbors. The important phase is the middle of
worm propagation, and the infected nodes significantly replicate themselves to attack
vulnerabilities.
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Figure 5 Bluetooth worm propagation speed per unit time
3.1.2 Density Effect
Density of the group is a very important factor. Because we assume the area size
is constant, we change the density by putting a different number of nodes in this square
area. In our simulation, we chose 50, 80, 100, 130, 150, 180, 200, 230, 250, 280 and
300 nodes in this square area. The properties and movement of each node under
default settings are random movement with random speed, and its spreading worm
behaviors follow the rules mentioned before.
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Figure 6 Propagation Curve of 50 Nodes (Infected Rate: 95%)

Figure 7 Propagation Curve of 200 Nodes (Infected Rate: 95%)
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Figure 8 Propagation Time in Different Density
Figure 6 and Figure 7 describe the relationship between the time of worm
propagation and infected nodes. The results in Figure5 and 6 are the same as in the
first experiment and is the another ways to present worm propagation speed, which is
low-spreading speed at the beginning and end of propagation, and in the middle of the
worm propagation the spreading process is fast. This behavior is the common property
for worms in wired networks. Figure 8 presents a curve between the propagation time
and density of the network. Obviously, with increasing the density of the network, in
other words, increasing the number of nodes, worm spreading speed is faster and more
nodes are infected. When only 50 nodes are in 1000 X 1000 square areas, the density
is 5.00E-5. It is a low density value, so it takes over 4000 seconds for malicious nodes
to infect 95% of vulnerable nodes within its operating range. The number of nodes
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increases to 80, and the propagation time decreases to 2914 seconds. When the
number of nodes is 100, the propagation time almost is half of the one in 50 nodes.
However, the potential tendency stops when nodes continue increasing. From 200
nodes to 300 nodes, the propagation time is greater than 1000 seconds, and it is hard
to continue to decrease the speed of worm propagation.
3.1.3 Effect of the moving speed of Bluetooth device
This paper discusses worm spreading in mobile wireless networks, so the speed
of each node is one of the important parameter in our simulation. We set the speed as 1,
2, 8, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 m/s; these are eleven different maximum speeds.
The speed 1 m/s is to simulate people taking a walk, and speed 2 m/s is regular speed
of a person. The maximum speed 8 m/s simulate a running person. From 15 m/s to 50
m/s, they cannot present any real scenarios and our purpose is to find the trend of
node’s speed argument for worm propagation.

Figure 9 Propagation Curve of Speed: 1 m/s and 2 m/s

25

Figure 10 Propagation Curve of Speed: 8m/s, 15 m/s and 20 m/s

Figure 11 Propagation Time in Different Speed
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The key of mobile wireless networks is that nodes can move, hence, the speed
indubitably is a major factor. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the comparing curve among
different speeds, and Figure 11 gives us speed and propagation curve. When the speed
changes from 1 m/s to 2 m/s and from 2 m/s to 8 m/s, the infected speed has huge
increasing. At the beginning of this curve, there is almost a linear relationship between
the speed of node and the propagation time. This is very useful for attackers and they
can try to move faster in order to accelerate the worm propagation. Above 8 m/s,
however, the speed seems not be the key parameter to affect the worm propagation.
Although the propagation time still decreases with the speed increasing, the value is too
small to help attackers to infect rapidly. Therefore, the speed in a certain range (e.g.
smaller than 8 m/s) can let the large number of nodes infected in mobile wireless
network.
3.1.4 Operating Range effect
Whenever you use any kind of wireless technology, all of them have the
operating range. Only two nodes within the operating range can set up connection and
transfer files with each other. Once out of the operating range, they have no any
relationship between them. With the development of wireless technology, operating
range could extend to a wide area.
Bluetooth technology has three kinds of operating range depending on the device
class:
Class 3 radios – have a range of up to 1 meter or 3 feet;
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Class 2 radios – most commonly found in mobile devices – have a range of 10
meters or 30 feet;
Class 1 radios – used primarily in industrial use cases – have a range of 100
meters or 300 feet.
In this experiment, we simulate all three standard operating ranges to predict the
effects in the future. We set 200 nodes in 1000 X 1000 square areas, the maximum
speed is 2 m/s and the number of initially infected nodes are 3.

Figure 12 Propagation Time of Range Effect
Simulation result:
-- Operating Range: 1,

Propagation time: 13382.9 s

-- Operating Range: 10,

Propagation time: 1488.65 s

-- Operating Range: 100, Propagation time: 274.41 s
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Except for the speed of the node, the operating range is another unavoidable
factor in Bluetooth networks. In modern society, there is the great number of Bluetooth
devices, and most users use Class 2 (10 meter operating range). When the operating
range is 1 meter, attackers take over 3.7 hours (over 13,000 seconds) to infect 189
nodes. If we use Class 2 standard operating range, attackers only take 1/10 time to
infect the same number of nodes. This is an unbelievable decrease, but this is not the
end of road. In the future, Bluetooth device would change to Class 3 (operating range is
up to 100 meters), and our experiment shows the propagation time is below 300
seconds to infect 189 nodes.
The operating range increases 10 times from 1 meter to 10 meters, and the
propagation time decrease 10 times as well. Although the propagation time only
decreases 5 times from Class 3 to Class 2, the worm-spreading process is so fast that
the network security engineer cannot response to it before huge damage. Therefore, the
Bluetooth worm is a potential threat for next-generation Bluetooth device.
3.1.5 Initial Infected Nodes
The price of Cell phones, smart phones and PDAs never stops decreasing
because manufactures continually develop new model devices, and it is very common
for a person to hold several Bluetooth devices. Therefore, attackers could use several
Bluetooth devices as seeds to start worm propagation at the same time. The different
numbers of initially infected nodes affect the speed of the worm propagation, and in
Figure 13 we can clearly understand this effect.
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Figure 13 Propagation Curve in Different Initially infected Nodes: 1, 5, 10

Figure 14 Initially infected Nodes and Propagation Time
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From Figure 14 the number of initially infected nodes is set from 1 to 10, and the
propagation time becomes short when we add initially infected nodes, but the
decreasing value is not too big. The primary reason is that when the number of initially
infected nodes increases, the opportunity of discovering vulnerable nodes decreases.
We can explain it by the worm propagation figure. When the worm infects over 90% of
nodes in the simulation area, the speed of worm propagation begins to decrease
significantly, so it is hard for an infected node to find a healthy, vulnerable neighbor node.
Therefore, increasing the number of initially infected node only helps worm spreading at
the beginning stage, while the most nodes are infected, the worm spreading changes to
low value. Above all we can know the number of initially infected nodes is not a key
factor of the worm propagation.
3.1.6 Contact Degree
In this section, we consider the contact degree of the Bluetooth device. We
assume that a Bluetooth device can set up only one connection with another Bluetooth
device, which means at one unit time attackers just infect one Bluetooth device. In
previous simulations, there was no such limitation. In this simulation, the contact degree
is set to 1. If an attacker finds several vulnerable neighbors, it only connects the one
neighbor with minimum distance between itself and them. In addition, in real wireless
networks, not all cell phones or PDAs have Bluetooth function. Because the devices
without Bluetooth function are immune to the Bluetooth worm, the 20% of cell phones
without Bluetooth function cannot be infected. We call 20% as the Healthy Rate. In this
experiment, we simulate 0%, 20%, 40% and 60% Healthy Rate, respectively. Figure 15
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shows a relationship between the propagation time and the Healthy Rate. Figure 16
compare two different contact degree. The basic arguments: Nodes 200, Speed 2m/s,
initially infected Nodes 3, Range 10m.

Figure 15 Propagation Time and Healthy Rate (200 Nodes, Speed 2m/s)
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Figure 16 Healthy Rate and Propagation Time (95% nodes are infected)
We can clearly find that if the Healthy Rate is high, the worm has to take more time
to infect vulnerable nodes. Originally, when the healthy rate increases so as to decrease
the total number of vulnerable nodes, it seems that the worm should take less time to
infect a smaller portion of nodes. On the contrary, the worm needs to take more time to
spread itself in the networks. In Figure 16, we compare two scenarios, such as contact
degree = 1 and contact degree <= 7, and it presents High contact degree can improve
the speed of the worm propagation.
3.1.7 Inquiry Time Effect
In the density, speed and initially infected nodes simulation, all experiments are
under the ideal model. In the previous simulation, we consider a constraint, the contact
degree of each node, but all of them assume no time to use for inquiring and setting up
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connection. A Bluetooth device, however, cannot ignore the above parameters. Normally,
both processes of inquiring and setting up connection should take several hundred mms,
even several seconds. We simulate the inquiry time as 0, 0.5,1, 1.5 and 2 seconds.
Then in second simulation, we assume each node takes 1 second to inquiry neighbors,
set up connection and finish the infected file transmission, but we change the node’s
speed.

Figure 17 Inquiries Time and Propagation Time (Speed 2 m/s)
In Figure 17, if the inquiry time is more than 0.5 second, the propagation time is
over two times longer than in the previous inquiry time experiment. When inquiry time is
2 seconds, the malicious node needs to take 5 hours to infect 95% of nodes in the
Bluetooth networks. Because every node always moves from one place to another and
the operating range is 10 m/s, sometimes a malicious node discovers a vulnerable
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neighbor, but both nodes may separate before the malicious node infect the vulnerable
node. This kind of case often happens in the real world. Therefore, the inquiry time limits
the worm propagation in Bluetooth networks.

Figure 18 Speed and Propagation Time (Inquiry Time = 1s)
Figure 18 gives us an interesting curve which is an inverted parabola shape. We
set the node’s speed as 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0 m/s when the inquiry time is
1 second. From 0.3 to 1 m/s, the propagation time decreases, however, from 1 to 4 m/s,
malicious nodes use more time to propagate. From the previous speed simulation, we
know the node’s speed is one of the most important arguments for worm propagation.
When we increase speed from 1 to 8 m/s, the propagation time is decreased greatly. In
this simulation, however, we get an opposite result and the only difference is that we
take the inquiry time argument into consideration. Analyzing the curve, we can find the
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reason is the same as the effect of changing inquiry time. Because operating range is a
constant argument, if we increase the node’s speed, the operating time between two
nodes decreases at same time. From this simulation, we learn increasing the node’s
speed is not a necessary condition for accelerating worm propagation.
The lowest point in this curve is 1 m/s. In this simulation, we also calculate the
two values, the average targets per neighbors (TPN) and the average targets per
propagation time (TPT). We record the number of targets in its neighbors and the
number of targets in each node.
Table 3 TPN and TPT
Speed (m/s)

TPN

TPT

0.8

0.142

0.066

1.0

0.125

0.074

2.0

0.069

0.076

3.0

0.038

0.058

The faster the speed of the Bluetooth device, the more neighbors the Bluetooth
device finds. This was true in the previous speed simulation. However, it changes if we
add the inquiry time into simulating parameter. When the speed increases from 0.8 m/s
to 2.0 m/s, the Bluetooth device can find more vulnerable targets per unit time. But once
the speed is more than 3.0 m/s, TPT goes to the opposite direction. That is the reason
for the shape of the curve in Figure 18. What is the lowest point? It is the point with
speed 1.0 m/s, but the TPT under speed 1.0 m/s is smaller than the TPT under speed
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2.0. We also need to check TPN in this case. The lower speed (1.0 m/s) infects more
neighbors to vulnerable targets, but the faster speed (2.0 m/s) cannot successfully infect
its neighbors because its neighbors do not stay for enough time within operating range.
3.1.8 Co-Channel Interference and Failure Rate
Many environmental factors could cause failure. Sometimes two Bluetooth
devices terminate communication during paring states so as not to be connected, and
sometimes connection has been set up, but transferring the file failed. This thesis
focuses on co-channel interference [26] in Bluetooth networks from peripheral Bluetooth
devices located in proximity of the ten-meter range. The probability of interference
increases as each new user connects to a Bluetooth network within the ten-meter range.
Bluetooth efficiency can suffer a drastic drop when too many Bluetooth devices are
active in a small area due to collisions. Data collisions require retransmits and with
retransmits speed or data throughput is degraded. Therefore, co-channel interference
increases the failure rate as well. We assume different failure rates with different
numbers of neighbors. If a Bluetooth device finds one neighbor and no others, we set
the Failure Rate as 0; if there are 1 to 2 other neighbors within their operating range, the
failure rate is 15%; when there are above 2 other neighbors, the Failure Rate is 25%.
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Figure 19 Propagation Curve in Failure Rate and No Failure Rate
Simulation result:
-- No-failure (ideal): Propagation time: 1475.52 s
-- Failure-enabled:

Propagation time: 1563.85 s

There is no big deference between the No-failure and Failure-enabled in our
experiment. Although both simulations use almost the same time to infect the same
number of vulnerable nodes, the Failure-enabled scenario still makes the spreading
speed slow. In Figure 19, in the middle of the propagation process, a solid line takes
longer time to propagate the same number of nodes as a two-dot line. In crowded
places, e.g. office cubicles, airports and movie cinema, there exists high-density
Bluetooth devices within ten-meter range. The co-channel interference would be a
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serious problem because of the high failure rate. In this situation, co-channel
interference helps us to stop worm propagation and decrease the spreading speed.
3.1.9 Speed and Inquiry Time Combination
In the previous simulation, we considered speed and inquiry time separately.
Now we take two arguments into consideration at the same time. Speed could impact
the inquiry time, and a user may take more time to set up connection than another with
lower speed. In this simulation, there are three assumptions as below.
• Speed: 0 ~ 1.0 m/s, Inquiry time: 0.5 s
• Speed: 1.0 ~ 2.0 m/s, Inquiry time: 1.0 s
• Speed: > 2.0 m/s, Inquiry time: 1.5 s
Table 4 Speed and Inquiry Time
Speed (m/s)

Propagation Time (s)

1

3590.89

2

3917.62

5

23643.3

Obviously, when the speed is over 5 m/s, and propagation time increase
significantly. Compared to the previous experiment (only considering speed argument),
attackers just use 1000 seconds to spread a worm. Therefore, so far, in a real wireless
environment, it is hard for an attacker to rapidly implement Bluetooth worm propagation.
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3.1.10 Energy Issue
Bluetooth technology is designed to have low power consumption. The Bluetooth
device is classified into three power classes. Table 5 describes the specification in detail.
Table 5 Power Class
Power
Class
1

Maximum Output Power
(Pmax)
100 mW (20 dBm)

Minimum Output Power
1 mW (0 dBm)

2

2.5 mW (4 dBm)

0.25 mW(-6 dBm)

3

1 mW (0 dBm)

N/A

.
The most commonly used radio is Class 2 which uses 2.5mW of power. Actually,
there are no Bluetooth devices, and there are only Bluetooth-enabled devices. These
include Bluetooth headsets, Bluetooth-enabled laptops, Bluetooth-enabled PDAs or
Bluetooth input devices. In some Bluetooth systems (e.g. laptops and appliances using
AC power), the Bluetooth will not be a noticeable drain on the system. However, in
some cases, the Bluetooth will dominate current consumption in a device. This is
especially true for simple devices such as a Bluetooth headset or a Bluetooth mouse.
Can the Bluetooth-enabled device work without charging? We choose headsets
to study the energy lifetime of Bluetooth devices because they completely use Bluetooth
function without other primary power consumptions. According to market products,
Bluetooth headsets typically offer 2-10 hours talking time or 25-250 hours standby. In
this simulation, we do not consider the standby case, and we assume attackers
continue to scan neighbors and transfer the infected file without time interval. From the
experiment result, the worst case is that a malicious node takes more than 5 hours to
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infect 95% of vulnerabilities in Bluetooth networks. However, in most of my simulations,
the propagation time is below 1.5 hours (5000 seconds). It is possible for attackers to
infect all vulnerabilities before the power of Bluetooth-enabled device is used up. If we
use a Bluetooth-enabled device with AC power, there is no necessary to consider
energy issue.
In the future, when Bluetooth technology uses Power Class 1 that is just 1 mW
output power, the Bluetooth-enabled device has longer lifetime and can provide
attackers more chance to spread the Bluetooth worm. Therefore, in this thesis, we don’t
take care of the Bluetooth energy (power) issue.
3.2

Simulation in Wide Wireless Network

In the real world, human activities are not just in a local group. Usually, people go
to work at company or school, and at weekend they go to movie cinema or park, even
from one city to another or one country to another. They always change groups or
places and not belong to a static group. Therefore, in wide wireless network simulations,
we assume some nodes in one group will transfer to another, and the wide network
simulation provides different density groups. We also use the Poisson distribution as the
transfer model, and assume that each group has a fix departure rate. For each group, it
runs the local wireless simulation. The difference between wide networks and local
networks is that the density of each group is variable during the simulation.
As above mentioned, we simulate five kinds of scenarios related with real people
activities. There are 20 groups with different nodes, such as 50, 100, 150 and 200.
-- Node Transfer scenario: People travel among different groups.
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-- Without node transferring scenario: All activities happen in local groups, and
people do not go out of their groups.
-- Add New Group scenario: Sometimes people could go to the one place at
same time, for example, movie cinema, national park, or arena. In this simulation people
are random selected from random groups to build a new group, and we assume there
are at least 3 infected nodes in the new group.
-- Remove New Group scenario: On the contrary, when the movie and game are
over, people go to different places. We simulate one group dismisses and people in this
group randomly join into other exist groups.
-- Adding and Removing Group scenario: This case assumes two events, group
adding and group removing, happen in one simulation. We assume they would not
happen at the same time as well.
Table 6 Large Scale Simulation
Event

Nodes

Propagation time

Add

2138

850

Without Transfer

1126

2000

Add And Remove

1640

2000

Only Transfer

2055

2000

Remove

2138

2000
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Figure 20 Large Scale Simulation (Max Simulation Time: 2000 s)
In Figure 20, we learn that the Adding new group event is the most helpful to
accelerate the worm propagation, and the next event is the Removing group event. And
then are only transferring event, adding and Removing Event. The last one is the event
without any transferring activity among groups. Those results tell us mobile property is
the most important factor for Bluetooth worm propagation. Even in wide scale wireless
environment, mobility in different groups still is a positive impact for the worm spreading.
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CHAPTER 4:

DEFENSE

Product developers that use Bluetooth wireless technology in their products have
several options to implement security issues. There are three modes of security for
Bluetooth access between two devices.
Security Mode 1: non-secure
Security Mode 2: service level enforced security
Security Mode 3: link level enforced security
The manufacturer of each product determines these security modes. Devices
and services also have different security levels. For devices, there are two levels:
"trusted device" and "un-trusted device." A trusted device, having been paired with one's
other device, has unrestricted access to all services. With regard to services, three
security levels are defined: services that require authorization and authentication,
services that require authentication only and services that are open to all devices.
Consumers can do a number of things to protect their data. If users have a
phone that is vulnerable to Bluetooth virus, they should contact the phone's
manufacturer to get developed software patches to fix the vulnerability. In addition, if
users are still concerned about a device being targeted, they can turn the device to nondiscoverable mode when not using wireless Bluetooth technology and in unknown areas.
Users can also ensure their data is secure by not "pairing" with unknown devices. If a
user were to receive an invitation to pair with another device, and asked to put in a PIN
code, but was unsure of what device was inviting to pair, the user should not pair, and
only pair with known devices.
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However, attackers still can find the address of the user even if user just pair with
trusted devices. He can overhear the initial pairing process between two Bluetoothenabled devices, and then use brute-force or other methods to guess the security key
[28] and masquerade as the second device during a connection. If successfully setting
up connection. It can transfer an infected file to implement worm propagation. According
to above simulation, in mobile network, attackers need to guess the security key very
quickly within the 10-meter operating range. If the PIN code is from manufacture that is
just four digital, it is very easy for attackers to spread worm in few seconds. If users set
the PIN code more complex, attackers has to take hours even several days to find the
right PIN. Hence a complex PIN code is one way to prevent Bluetooth worm.
All computer worms including the Bluetooth worm have a same property,
spreading rapidly. It is un-normal behavior in networks. Also, in our simulations, we find
the co-channel interference is a negative factor for the Bluetooth worm spreading.
Therefore, one defense method is to set a monitor and interference system in popular
places since the Bluetooth worm attacking is implemented mostly in this kind of place.
When the system finds a suspect device that continually pairs and transfers files to
others, firstly the system sends a warning message to the virus center for further
analysis. Meanwhile, the system tries to response all pairing quests in order to generate
a co-channel interference problem in this wireless Bluetooth network. This process
reduces the spreading speed of the Bluetooth worm so as to let the virus center develop
patches to prevent the worm propagation in time.
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CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

Computer worm spread by Bluetooth technology still is a new way in the wireless
network, and so far it does not bring the huge damage for wireless networks. Since all
Bluetooth worms need be activated by a manual operation, it cannot spread rapidly.
However, Bluetooth technology will be growth quickly in order to communicate in larger
range, to transfer bigger size package and more rapidly, and smart phones will become
a mobile micro device with full computer’s functions. Those new techniques will boost
the Bluetooth worm propagation in wireless networks.
To reduce the Bluetooth worm damage, even to predict the Bluetooth worm, this
thesis studies its behaviors based on new simulator – BTWS. The mobility of Bluetoothenabled devices in Mobile wireless network is the primary effect of the worm spreading,
and if attackers control their speed at 1 or 2 m/s so as to achieve the maximum worm
propagation. The Inquiry time is another key feature of Bluetooth technology, and it
determines whether or not the worm can infect vulnerable devices. If the newgeneration Bluetooth technology can significant reduce the inquiry time, it will be easy
for Bluetooth devices to communicate to each other, but it is also a disaster for the
wireless network security. In the large wide wireless environment, attackers could
change its location in order to spread the worm quickly. For network security issue, it is
hard for security engineer to find the source of the worm due to its mobility. In the future,
we can build a worm propagation model to further study its behavior in order to improve
the defense system.
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